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I. INTRODUCTION
Ohio maintains a high interest in protecting business against the
misappropriation of proprietary information and property. This is evidenced
by the enactment of two statutes within the criminal code, one dealing with the
conversion of trade secrets2 and the other dealing with the breach of confidence
by employees.3 The protection afforded to businesses by these statutes,
however, may be ineffective when the information is disclosed through the
media, where laws protecting sources and supporting freedom of the press
challenge the effectiveness of these two statutes. This issue was recently
1 The author wishes to dedicate this article to the memory of John M. Tkacik.
2 0Hio REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.51 (Baldwin 1991).
3 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.81 (Baldwin 1991).
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brought to the forefront by The Wall Street Journal's reporting of confidential
information concerning Ohio's corporate giant, Procter & Gamble (P & G).4
In the P & G example, two separate articles appeared in The Wall Street Journal
concerning the company. The first article reported the forced resignation of P
& G's executive vice president in charge of its food division.5 The second article
appeared the next day reporting the possible sale of portions of P & G's food
and beverage division.6 Although representatives of P & G confirmed the
earlier story and denied the latter, both publications disturbed P & G's
management. It was not the veracity of the stories that upset P & G but rather
that both articles contained corporate confidential information that the
newspaper could have obtained only through a member or former member of
the organization. 7
P & G's management, aware that confidential information had been
disclosed outside the company, conducted an internal investigation to
determine the source of the newspaper's information. 8 The internal
investigation proved unsuccessful. P & G had recourse, however, under either
of the two Ohio statutes which make it a crime for employees to disclose a
company's trade secrets or its confidential information.9 An investigation
ensued following P & G's request for a police inquiry. The police investigation
included a subpoena to Cincinnati Bell, Inc., for all telephone records within
the area in order to ascertain the individual(s) who contacted the author of The
Wall Street Journal articles. 10 Although the purpose of the investigation was to
4 Procter & Gamble's revenues exceeded $24 billion in 1991, placing the company
22nd among the U.S corporations (first in Ohio) for total revenue. Dun's Business
Rankings, DuN's MARKETING SERVICES, INC., 126,657 (1991). P & G employs over 89,000
people, ranking 57th in that category. Id. at 657.
5Alecia Swasy, Procter & Gamble Food Executive is Forced Out, WALL ST. J., June 10,
1991, at B5.
6Alecia Swasy, P & G May Soon Peddle Something New: Pieces of Its Food and Beverage
Division, Wall St. J., June 11, 1991, at B1.
7Telephone Interview with Terry Loftus, Company Spokesperson for Procter &
Gamble (January 7,1992).
8p & G's information was first disclosed in February, 1991. The disclosure continued
and some information leaked directly to competitors. Initially, management pursued
an internal investigation concerned that an external investigation would alert their
competitors to specific information. The failure of the internal investigation and the
consistent disclosure of confidential information forced management's decision to
pursue criminal action. Id.
9See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.51, 1333.81 (Baldwin 1991).
10See Swasy, supra note 6. See also Martin Dickson, The Time to Come Clean, FINANCIAL
TIMES, September 10, 1991, at 114. This investigation was conducted in an attempt to
determine whether Ohio's criminal code had been violated. At the time the investigation
was terminated, there had been no active involvement or acceptance of this matter by
the Hamilton County Prosecutor's Office. It is uncertain whether the prosecutor's office
would have accepted this case had P & G insisted on pursuing the matter. Telephone
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discover the informant's identity, the media viewed it as an attack on their
ability to disseminate information to the public. P & G became the target of
negative publicity.11 The media focused on the issue that P & G used its
influence to order an investigation that included the violation of a person's
right to privacy as well as infringing on the freedom of the press as guaranteed
by the First Amendment. On the other hand, P & G's management felt they had
a fiduciary duty to the shareholders in pursuing an investigation.
P & G, unable to locate the individual responsible for the disclosures,
terminated its efforts and publicly admitted that management had made an
error in judgment by requesting the inquiry.12 Since P & G relies on the media
to promote its products, one can argue that the pressure exerted by the media
forced P & G to terminate the investigation. Thus, this incident involved the
struggle between a company's legal right to protect delicate confidential
information, and the rights of the media under statutes and the Constitution.
This Note will address the problem facing businesses in Ohio when the laws
protecting trade secrets and confidential information come into direct conflict
with laws protecting the media. Part II of this Note will discuss the concept and
various legal definitions attributed to trade secrets and confidential proprietary
information. Parts III and IV will discuss trade secrets, confidential information
and the related remedies available to companies, with emphasis on the statutes
under Ohio's criminal code. This Note will then focus on the protection
afforded the media by both an Ohio shield statute13 which protects confidential
sources, and the U.S. Constitution which protects freedom of the press.
14
Finally, this Note will suggest that a company can pursue legal recourse for
obtaining the identity of informants directly from the media, through the use
of a grand jury subpoena, since newspersons are not entitled to an absolute
testimonial privilege. 15
interview with Terry Gaines, Assistant Prosecutor for Hamilton County Prosecutor's
Office (January 26,1992).
11 See, e.g., Rita Ciolli & Dottie Enrico, P & G Tries to Plug (News) Leak, NEWSDAY,
August 13, 1991, at 17 ("we fear Procter & Gamble is trying to intimidate current and
former employees from talking to reporters"); Randall Rothenberg, Employee Phone
Records Examined in Company's Search for News Leaks, N. Y. TIMES, August 13, 1991, at
A13 ("Procter & Gamble appears to be saying, this information you acquire while an
employee is ours and you don't have the right to disclose it ... if this becomes a
broad-based theory, it becomes a huge club to beat people to stop them from saying
what you don't want them to say"). Procter & Gamble's annual advertising expenditure
exceeds 1.5 billion dollars in its effort to promote its product line within the competitive
consumer goods market. The company has established an employment policy that is
based on strict adherence to confidentiality in P & G's attempt to maintain a competitive
edge in the market and its integrity throughout the industry. Swasy, supra note 6.
12 See Dickson, supra note 10.
13 0HIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Baldwin 1991).
14U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15In cases where news reporters have been compelled to disclose confidential
information, the media contends that the U.S. Constitution as well as individual state
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II. WHAT ARE TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION?
A. Corporate Property and Confidential Relationship
A company relies on different types of property in order to succeed and
survive in the world of business. In order to withstand the challenges, and
maintain a competitive edge within the industry, a company must make every
effort to protect its property from misappropriation. Most would identify
business property as an item that has physical existence or that can be readily
observed. This class of property, referred to as tangible property, can easily be
ascertained by running a checklist of the company's assets. Tangible property
includes such items as buildings, machinery, equipment and inventory. A
company will generally utilize a system of checks and balances to prevent loss
of this type of property although the physical nature of the property may by
itself prevent loss. Many organizations may also depend on intellectual
property such as patents and copyrights. Intellectual property, classified as
intangible property because it lacks physical characteristics, also appears as an
asset on a company's balance sheet. This class of property has been granted
protection under federal statutes but the statutes require that a company
maintain proper compliance with the law in order to protect against the
misappropriation of its interest.16
Trade secrets and confidential information lack concrete definitions17 but
this does not lessen their recognition as business property.18 Both are similar
to intellectual property because they also lack physical existence and, therefore,
shield statutes provide an absolute testimonial privilege protecting the reporter against
such disclosure. The United States Supreme Court, however, has failed to recognize a
testimonial privilege arising from the First Amendment. See infra notes 128-34 and
accompanying text. Ohio case law indicates that the government's failure to satisfy an
informal balancing test will entitle the reporter to a conditional privilege. See infra notes
144-54 and accompanying text.
16See 17 U.S.C. § 101-917 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (copyrights); 35 U.S.C. § 1-376 (Law.
Co-op 1991) (patents). Copyrights and patents have been granted federal protection
under the U.S. Constitution. This protection originates in Article I, section 8, clause 8
which states that Congress has the power "to promote the Progress of Science and Useful
Arts; by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
Respective Writings and Discoveries." See generally ARTHUR H. SEIDEL, WHAT THE
GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNow ABOUT TRADE SECRETS AND EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENTS § 2.01(a) (1984).
17Although it would appear that identifying certain classes of property and ideas as
confidential would be readily apparent, the reality is that trade secrets and confidential
information can be very complex. The applicable laws are complicated by the fact that
the subject matter involved may not always fit perfectly within the nebulous definition
of trade secrets or confidential information. The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b(1939) states that it is impossible to provide an exact definition of a trade secret. Secrecy
is the essential element needed for classifying subject matter as a trade secret. Id. The
Restatement lists six factors that are used by the courts for determining the existence of
a trade secret. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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are classified as intangibles. This is the extent of any similarity, however, as
trade secrets and confidential information are not found on a company's
balance sheets. In addition, this property is not protected under federal law
because it normally does not meet the statutory requirements for intellectual
property.19 The lack of federal protection does not lessen the value that
companies place on trade secrets and confidential information. Both remain an
integral part of the organization. Due to their lack of physical characteristics,
however, trade secrets and confidential information remain very difficult to
protect. Federal action may be available under a more general law
2° but
protecting the property is a task that generally remains with the states.
21
Employees obtain trade secrets and confidential information while in a
confidential relationship with their employers.
22 The employer's reliance on
the confidential relationship to protect the subject matter distinguishes trade
secrets and confidential information from the above-mentioned property of an
organization.23 Another distinguishing factor consists of the individual's
19Since there is no precise method for determining whether property will be afforded
protection as a patent, it is difficult for the property owner to distinguish between
patents and trade secrets. Although patentable property is usually novel and more
specific than a trade secret, the final determination is made by the U.S. Patent Office. In
order to obtain a patent, an application containing a full description of the property
must be filed with the Patent Office. Many inventors, fearing reiection of their
application, elect protection under the state's trade secret law thus avoiding the
disclosure of their secret. Other inventors will choose trade secret protection because
they cannot afford the high costs that accompany the patent process. See JAMES H.A.
POOLEY, TRADESECRETSA GUIDE TO PROTECTING PROPRIETARYINFORMATION, 14-37 (1989).
Trade secrets and confidential information, although lacking physical existence, have
been recognized as property by the United States Supreme Court. See infra notes 69-71
and accompanying text.
20Stanley S. Arkin, Trade Secret Abuse and Criminal Law, in TRADE SECRET LITIGATION
155, 159 (Practising Law Institute, 1985).
2 lUnless Congress takes an active role regulating trade secrets, the United States
Supreme Court has stated that trade secret legislation will be left to the discretion of the
states. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974).
22 See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. A trade secret can be disclosed to
parties outside the employment relationship without a company losing its protection of
the trade secret. In order to maintain trade secret status, the party to whom the disclosure
is made must be obligated to maintain its secrecy. See infra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text.
23 Unlike intellectual property, trade secrets and confidential information are not
disclosed to the public. The employer must rely on the employees to maintain the secrecy
of information obtained during the working relationship. Patent and copyright laws,
however, provide the holder with a legal monopoly for a period of years in exchange
for public disclosure. The purpose of the patent and copyright laws are to encourage
innovation and the expression of ideas without depriving the value of the patent or
copyright to its holder. Patent law awards the holder of the patent with exclusive rights
to protectable property whereas copyright law protects the expression of ideas such as
the material in books, drawings and blueprints. See generally J. POOLEY, supra note 19, at
14-19.
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ability to misappropriate trade secrets and confidential information with ease
since the individual can easily transmit orally the secrets and information to
persons outside the company. Contrary to the saying that "talk is cheap,"
divulging trade secrets and confidential information can lead to substantial
deprivation to the company since the very existence of this property is
destroyed upon the loss of the secret.24
Trade secrets and confidential information possess value for an organization
because the holder of the property can attain a substantial competitive edge
within the respective industry.25 This property consists of subject matter that
relates to a company's technology or its proprietary business information such
as customer lists, financial reports or business plans.26 There is protection
under trade secret laws for technological property that will not meet the strict
requirements of federal patent law, or for a party who has no interest in
pursuing a patent.27 It follows that trade secret laws are designed to encourage
the development and innovation of new ideas and inventions by protecting
property which may not be patentable nor fall into another statutory protective
classification. 28
B. Trade Secrets
Trade secret law, derived from common law, developed slowly in the United
States. It is believed that the first trade secret case to face the courts was Vickery
v. Welch,29 which appeared before the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1837.
It was not until 1889, 52 years later, that the United States Supreme Court
confronted its first trade secret case in Fowle v. Park.30 The law continued to
develop but the courts still unsuccessfully defined trade secrets, thus leaving
the boundaries of the legal concept limitless.31 In 1939, after the lapse of another
50 years, the Restatement of Torts was published and with it came the first
attempt to reconcile the misguided and undefined area of trade secrets. It was
the Restatement which united the common law concepts and became the
24 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 757, cmt. c (1939).
2 5 See 467 U.S. at 1011-12; Wiebold Studio, Inc. v. Old World Restorations, Inc., 484
N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985); See generally J. POOLEY, supra note 19, at 21.
26See J. POOLEY, supra note 19, at 6-7.
27 Property may meet the requirements of a patent but the owner feels more secure
seeking protection under trade secret laws rather than federal patent law. See J. POOLEY,
supra note 19. (the owner cannot afford the high costs associated with the patent process
and fears the loss of information if the patent is rejected).
28Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974).
2936 Mass. 523 (1837); MELvIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 2.02 (1991).
30131 U.S. 88 (1889); M. JAGER, supra note 29, at § 2.03.
31 See M. JAGER. supra note 29, at § 3.01.
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centerpiece for trade secret cases.32 The Restatement defined trade secrets as all
business information kept secret, not limited to a single event but "continuously
used in the business."3
3
The one prerequisite that must be established before subject matter will
qualify as a trade secret under the Restatement is the presence of the element of
secrecy.34 Although the Restatement requires the presence of a substantial
amount of secrecy the courts have determined that total secrecy is not required.
In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,35 Chief Justice Burger of the United States
Supreme Court declared "this necessary element of secrecy is not lost, however,
if the holder of the trade secret reveals the trade secret to another in confidence,
and under an implied obligation not to use or disclose it."36 Acompany's failure
to maintain a substantial amount of secrecy will disqualify the subject matter
for treatment as a trade secret.
The complexity of trade secret law was indicated by the Restatement's authors
who acknowledged that there was no precise definition that could attach to the
term. 37 In an attempt to clarify the concept of trade secrets, the Restatement
provided the following criteria to aid in the evaluation of whether one's
property qualifies as a trade secret:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others
involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to
guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information
to him and his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money
expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or
32 1d.
33 The Restatement defines a trade secret as follows:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound,
a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern
for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939).
3 4Id. Although a company maintains secrecy to preserve the trade secret, the subject
matter will not be protected if it is obtained by parties outside the company through
lawful means. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,490 (1974). Trade secrets
can be obtained legally through the use of another party's independent invention,
reverse engineering and discovery under a license issued by the owner of the trade
secret. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Cmt. 14 U.L.A. 438 (1992).
35416 U.S. 470 (1974).
36 1d. at 475 (quoting Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154,
156 (1887)).
3 7 See supra note 17.
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difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others? 8
The Restatement's six-factor checklist remains a significant barometer utilized
by the courts in determining the existence of trade secrets. 39
The courts did not hesitate to recognize and cite the Restatement.40 The
Restatement succeeded so well in establishing a foundation for trade secret law
that the subject was omitted by the framers of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.41
This was not the overall opinion of scholars in the area of trade secrets, who
strongly believed that it was an error to exclude the subject from the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.42 In response to the uneasiness experienced by those in the
area of trade secrets, a codification of the basic common law principles resulted
in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (U.T.S.A.). 43
Since its approval by the American Bar Association in 1980, the U.T.S.A. has
met with much success, and by 1992, had been adopted as law in 37 states.44
The U.T.S.A. provides the following definition of trade secrets which the
individual states may modify:
Trade secret means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i)
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
4 5
The U.T.S.A. resulted in two major deviations from the Restatement. First, where
the Restatement required the property to be "continuously used in one's
business,"46 the U.T.S.A. extended protection to property not currently used as
a trade secret, or under circumstances where the owner only retained potential
value in the items.47 Thus, under the U.T.S.A., subject matter remaining in the
developmental stage will be protected as trade secrets. Second, the U.T.S.A.
38RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939).
39 See M. JAGER, supra note 29, § 3.01.
40Id.
41/d.
42 d. at § 3.04. See also UNIF. TRADE SEcRETsAcT, Prefatory Note, 14 U.LA. 434 (1992).
43 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Prefatory Note, 14 U.L.A. 434 (1992).
44See Id. at 78-86 (Supp. 1992) for a listing of the states adopting the U.S.T.A. and their
respective statutory citations.
451d. at § 1, cl. 4, 14 U.L.A. 438.
46 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939).
47 See UNIF. TRADE SEcRETS ACT, Cmt. 14 U.L.A. 439 (1992).
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required that secrecy be maintained by using reasonable efforts dictated by the
circumstances. In cases where property was previously presumed to be secret,
the U.T.S.A. shifted the burden on the holder of the trade secret to prove the
use of reasonable care in protecting the information from disclosure.48
III. LEGAL REMEDIES PROTECTING AGAINST THE Loss OF TRADE SECRETS
The Restatement and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act provide a mechanism for
determining the existence of a trade secret. Once property has been classified
as a trade secret, the owner must determine how he or she will protect the
property and obtain relief in the event of a loss. The trade secret holder who
suffers a loss due to misappropriation is presented with various legal
remedies.4 9 As described by one court, trade secret law is a composition of the
agency, contract, tort and property theories of law.50 These four aspects of trade
secrets are discussed below with respect to legal remedies for protecting against
loss.
Trade secrets are generally obtained while individuals are involved in an
employer-employee relationship. The Restatement (Second) of Agency suggests
that this type of relationship falls within the auspices of agency law.5 1 The
underlying principle of agency law is the existence of a confidential
relationship, thereby placing a fiduciary duty on the agent.52 Consequently, the
481d.
49A plaintiff should seek equitable relief by obtaining an injunction that will restrict
the defendant's use of the trade secret. David Bender, Trade Secrets: Planning for
Litigation, in TRADE SECRET LITIGATION, 95, 106-07 (Practising Law Institute, 1985). A
company should also file for a temporary restraining order since the delays associated
with the issuance of an injunction can lead to irreparable injury. Dean A. Olds & Jeffrey
A. Handelman, Trade Secret Litigation: The Plaintiffs Perspective, in TRADE SECRET
LITIGATION, 193, 207 (Practising Law Institute, 1985). Following an injunction, a civil
court can provide the plaintiff with damages for any loss in the trade secret's value. Id.
at 208-09. Charges may also be brought against the wrongdoer in criminal court, thus
acting as a deterrent for similar acts in the future. Bender, supra, at 98-99.
SOEngineered Mechanical Servs. v. Langlois, 464 So. 2d 329,333 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
51The employment relationship, a form of the master-servant relationship, is
recognized under the agency principles of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 and cmt. a (1958). Agency Law creates the legal
relationship between the parties, it does not supply the remedy. Any wrongdoing by
the agent allows the principal to pursue: "(1) an action in breach of contract, (2) an action
in tort for harm and (3) an action for the value of the benefit taken." HAROLD G.
REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAMA. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 70 at 125
(1979). See notes 57-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various remedies.
52 REUSCHLEIN etal., supra note 51, at § 4, at10-11 (1979). Although the term "fiduciary"
has been applied to various legal relationships, there exists no precise definition for the
term. Fiduciary duty, for purposes of agency law, implies that the employee "is under
a duty to act solely and entirely for the benefit of his principal in every matter connected
with his agency." Id. at § 67, at 121.
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employee, as an agent, owes a duty of loyalty to his employer.53 Agency law,
however, is not limited to the employer-employee relationship and may exist
between independent parties.54
More specifically, an agent owes a duty "[n]ot to use or communicate
information confidentially given him by the principal or acquired by him
during the course of or on account of his agency or in violation of his duties of
an agent."55 The purpose is to encourage the free flow of information between
employer and employee. Agency law also recognizes the information or trade
secret as property belonging to the principal and demands that nondisclosure
continue following the termination of the agency relationship.5 6
Contract law theory affords another avenue for trade secret litigation. More
trade secret cases are tried under the contract theory of law since evidence of
the written contract can provide adequate support for the plaintiff.5 7 Where a
contract is not physically in existence, the courts may imply a contract based
on the facts and circumstances. 58
Another type of contract theory that protects trade secrets is the
quasi-contract which arises from the confidential relationship between parties.
The courts base their findings on an implied understanding to form a
contract.59 The rationale is that the quasi-contract prevents the unjust
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 51, at § 387. An agent is under a duty
to act for the sole benefit of the principal. Id. at cmt. b. The duty of loyalty prohibits the
employee from using information obtained during the agency relationship to take unfair
advantage of hisposition as an agent. Id. Seealso, Space Aero Products Co. v. R.E. Darling
Co., 208 A.2d 74 (Md. 1965) (holding that former employees owed a duty of trust and
fidelity pertaining to employer's trade secret).
54 An agency relationship arises out of the principal's manifestation to the agent that
the agent will act on behalf of and under the control of the principal. The agent's
acceptance to act for the principal creates the legal relationship. Determining whether
a principal-agent relationship exists requires an evaluation of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the agreement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra
note 51, at § 1, cmt. a.
55Id. at § 395. Trade secrets acquired by employees during the course of employment
should not be used to the employer's detriment. See REUSCHLEIN et al., supra note 51, at
§ 68 at 123.
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 51, at § 396, cmt. g. See, e.g., Space
Aero Products Co. v. R.E. Darling, 208 A.2d 74 (Md. 1965) (former employees violated
confidential relationship).
57 See M. JAGER, supra note 29, at § 4.0111].
581d.
59Although the quasi-contract (implied-in-law) does not fit within the definition of
a contract, contract theory provides the courts with an appropriate remedy.
Quasi-contract theory is a method, based on fairness, by which the courts can reallocate
losses and gains between the parties involved. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACrs § 1-12, at 19-20 (3rd ed. 1987). An example of the
implied-in-law contract is the at-will employment relationship where an employee is
hired without a contract. The lack of an employment contract does not bar an employer
from obtaining relief against the employee who breaches the confidential relationship.
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enrichment of one party resulting from the absence of an actual contract to
support an agreement. In order to succeed under the quasi-contract theory, the
plaintiff must prove the existence of a confidential relationship and that there
were limits placed on the disclosure of information acquired during that
relationship.6o
Some courts limit liability to the terms of the contract, however, leaving the
plaintiff with no claim for additional liability under the other theories of trade
secret law.61 The contract theory, like agency law, is not limited to the
employment relationship. It may also apply when the information is disclosed
to a third party with the understanding that the parties will maintain
confidentiality.6 2 If permission to use the trade secret coincides with the
contract, its use may cease upon termination of the agreement.63
Relief is also available to the holder of a trade secret under tort law. The
Restatement provides that liability results if the "disclosure or use constitutes a
breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to
him.' 64 Under the tort theory, the focus shifts to the confidential relationship
with less significance placed on the subject matter. As stated by the Supreme
Court in E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Co. v. Masland,65 "the property may be denied,
but the confidence cannot be."66 It follows that the existence of a confidential
relationship becomes a prerequisite for advancing a claim under tort law. The
plaintiff may also seek redress in civil court by advancing a claim of unfair
It is the confidential relationship that establishes the implied contract between the
parties. See M. JAGER, supra note 29, at § 4.01111.
60 See, M. JAGER, supra note 29, at § 4.0111].
61Courts maintain strict adherence to the terms of the contract thus preventing
additional relief under common law or state trade secret statutes if not stated in the
language of the contract. Id.
62 See supra note 59 & accompanying text.
63 See M. JAGER, supra note 29, at § 4.01[1].
64RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(b) (1939).
65244 U.S. 100 (1917).
66 Id. at 102. See also, Space Aero Products Co. v. R.E. Darling Co. 208 A.2d 74 (Md.
1965); General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Frantz, 272 N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966). In
Space Aero, Darling filed action seeking an injunction restricting former employees from
manufacturing oxygen tubes. The court found that the tubes required a special design
that qualified for protection as a trade secret. The Space Aero Court distinguished the
tort and property theories of trade secret law. The court recognized trade secrets as
property when the subject matter, such as diagrams or blue prints, can be physically
acquired by the wrongdoer. 208 A.2d at 87. The court determined that the property
concept is not applicable when the trade secret consists of confidential information. In
this situation, the wrongdoermust obtain the trade secret through communications with
an employee who legally has possession of the trade secret. Thus, this set of facts
provides a remedy for the employee's breach of confidence under the tort theory of law.
Id.
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competition when the information is utilized in a way that violates the
relationship, thus causing an adverse effect on the owner.67
Property theory affords another means of relief under trade secret law. The
struggle between the property and tort theories has led to the confusion in trade
secret law. The debate, which appears evident from the decisions found in the
United States Supreme Court, has persisted as to whether the remedy for trade
secret violations should be determined as a misappropriation under property
law or as a breach of the confidential relationship under tort law. Justice Holmes
stated in Masland that the focus of trade secret law should be on the confidential
relationship, not the subject matter.68 In a later United States Supreme Court
case, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 69 Justice Blackmun claimed that trade secrets,
like other intangibles, should be considered property for purposes of protection
under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.70 The Supreme Court later
recognized the property theory in Carpenter v. United States71 where a
conviction for violations of the Federal Wire and Mail Fraud Statutes was
supported by classifying the confidential information as property.72 Ironically,
in Carpenter, The Wall Street Journal claimed its reporter had violated a fiduciary
duty by disclosing confidential information belonging to the Journal.
67 See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 130,
1023 (5th ed. 1984).
68244 U.S. at 102.
69467 U.S. 986 (1984). The appellee in Monsanto was the developer of pesticides.
Monsanto argued that information submitted on an application, required by federal
law, consisted of trade secrets that would be valuable to appellee's competitor. It was
appellee's contention that trade secrets, although intangible in nature, had the
characteristics of tangible property thus the federal provisions violated the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause. The Court held that trade secrets, recognized as an
intangible property right under state law, were protected under the Takings Clause. Id.
at 1003.
70Id. at 1003-04.
71484 U.S. 19 (1987).
72 /d. at 26-28. The petitioner in Carpenter was a reporter with The Wall Street Journal.
Petitioner obtained confidential information which was to be used for his column in the
Journal. As a scheme to profit from the market's reaction to his column, the reporter
disclosed the information to third parties prior to the column's release. The Court stated
that "[clonfidential information acquired or compiled by a corporation in the course and
conductof its business is a species of property to which the corporation has the exclusive
right and benefit." Id. at 26. The Carpenter Court did not address the issue of whether
the information disclosed met the characteristics of a trade secret. The result, however,
reinforces the position that proprietary information is recognized as property despite
its intangible nature. Since trade secrets were classified as property by the Monsanto
Court, Carpenter indicates that trade secret protection will be available under 18 U.S.C.§ 341 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (mail fraud) and 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (wire
fraud). See also Stanley S. Arkin, supra note 20, at 164. Procter & Gamble may have
pursued action under the federal wire fraud statute. This note is limited to the legal
protection afforded by Ohio's criminal code, therefore, it does not address the criminal
action available under federal statutes.
[Vol. 41:175
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss1/8
1993] TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 187
Shifting the classification of trade secrets and confidential information into
a concept of property has led to the use of criminal sanctions for
misappropriation. Prior to the Monsanto decision, opponents argued that trade
secrets could not be stolen because of their intangible nature.73 Monsanto
answered the earlier arguments by classifying trade secrets as property
belonging to the holder.74 In a criminal action for the misappropriation of trade
secrets, the elements focused on by the courts are the intentional
misappropriation of the property and the owners strict adherence to the secrecy
requirement. 75
A party whose trade secret has been misappropriated must evaluate all facts
relative to the circumstances before proceeding through the criminal system.
The following advantages should be considered and may support the owner's
decision to pursue criminal action. First, a conviction in criminal court may
lead to the incarceration of the wrongdoer which can act as a deterrent for
future violations. 76 Second, since the responsibility of prosecuting the
wrongdoer rests with the government, the holder of the trade secret will
expend less in legal fees.77 Third, a favorable decision may lead to a successful
action in civil court where damages can be awarded to the owner for any loss
resulting from the misappropriation. Finally, criminal investigators have access
to more information through the use of search warrants and subpoenas.78 The
ability to use search warrants and subpoenas provides the prosecutor with a
greater opportunity for discovering significant facts as well as determining the
identity of the wrongdoer.79
In view of the above facts, one might wonder why a party would not advance
a case through the criminal process. Certainly, it would seem beneficial for the
73 See generally M. JAGER, supra note 29, at § 4.01.
74 Id.
75Id.
76SeeJ. POOLEY, supra note 19, at 213-16.
771d.
78The use of search warrants and subpoenas enables quicker access to records and
documents. Obtaining the same records in a civil action requires a court order before
the requested information must be produced. Acquiring the court order can be a
time-consuming process that provides the wrongdoer an opportunity to destroy or alter
important information. Id.
79 See David Bender, supra note 49, at 106. An internal investigation was initially
undertaken in the P & G incident. After P & G's investigation proved to be unsuccessful,
the case was placed with local police who were able to obtain a subpoena through the
prosecutor's office. The subpoena permitted investigators to search through the local
telephone company's records. Telephone interview with Terry Gaines, Assistant
Prosecutor for Hamilton County Prosecutor's Office (January 26, 1992). The use of the
subpoena allowed investigators to view over 40 million calls made from over 650,000
telephone lines within the Cincinnati area in an attempt to locate the source of the
telephone calls to The Wall Street Journal. See Scope of Phone Probe Grows, USA TODAY,
August 15, 1991, at 1A.
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owner, suffering from a misappropriated secret or disclosed confidential
information, to file criminal charges which would place responsibility with
government. Unfortunately, the disadvantages that accompany the criminal
case may outweigh the benefits received.
As soon as the case is placed with the government, the holder of the trade
secret no longer maintains control. Once the charges are filed, responsibility
shifts to the prosecutor who must determine any subsequent action.80 Cases
placed within the criminal court may find less success since the burden of proof
is a higher standard than in civil cases. Obtaining a favorable verdict requires
the prosecutor to overcome the challenge of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The following three disadvantages may be the most critical reasons why a
party should proceed cautiously into the criminal process. First, the criminal
case will proceed in the public courts which presents the possibility that the
information being protected will be disclosed during the criminal process. 81
Second, a defeat at the criminal level may lead to lawsuits by the other parties,
who may now have criminal action against the party filing the original
charges. 82 Finally, the greatest drawback arising from trade secret litigation in
the criminal courts might be the bad publicity that accompanies the case.83
The last factor, the negative publicity, was evidently instrumental in P & G's
decision to terminate its investigation. P & G's purpose for the investigation
was to determine the individual responsible for disclosing its confidential
information. However, The Wall Street Journal believed it had to consider its
own interest, the dissemination of news to the public.84 The problem facing P
& G was compounded because other members of the media, not just The Wall
Street Journal, took offense to the action. For P & G, a company that depends on
favorable advertising throughout the various media networks to promote its
8OSee J. POOLEY, supra note 19, at 216-17.
811d. at 219.
82 See David Bender, supra note 49, at 100-01. Parties involved in the P & G
investigation considered pursuing legal action against the Ohio corporation. See
Dickson, supra note 10, at 1-14.
8 3 See David Bender, supra note 49, at 100. See also supra note 11 discussing P & G's
reliance on favorable advertising in order to promote its products.
8 4Two articles were published in The Wall Street Journal based on information that
the management of P & G intended to remain confidential. A successful investigation
would have discovered the source of the disclosure thus leaving the newspaper without
a future informant. The newspaper was also concerned that investigations, such as the
one conducted for P & G, are a violation of the First Amendment's freedom of the press
clause. However, the right to protect sources, professed as absolute by the media, has
not been recognized as a First Amendment right by the United States Supreme Court.
See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text. Ohio case law indicates that its state shield
statute entitles the reporter to protect sources under a conditional privilege. See infra
notes 144-54 and accompanying text.
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products, the poor publicity proved too great a burden to overcome.85 In order
to protect its interest in publishing articles, the media was able to use its
influence to immobilize the company's efforts, thereby deterring P & G from
using the legal system to protect its property rights.
IV. CRIMINAL PROTECTION WITHIN OHIO
A. Trade Secrets
Ohio has recognized the conversion of trade secrets as a violation under its
criminal code since 1967.86 Although 37 states have adopted trade secret laws
to follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,87 Ohio's failure to adopt the U.T.S.A.
indicates the legislature's satisfaction with its own statute. Ohio's reluctance to
adopt the U.T.S.A. does not make the state any less restrictive or more lenient
in its treatment of trade secret violations. On the contrary, Ohio's legal history
regarding trade secrets may afford the state the distinction as being the "trade
secrets capitol of the United States."88
In addition to enacting a criminal statute that provides a third degree felony
charge for trade secret violations, 89 Ohio has been the origin of two leading
cases relating to trade secrets:90 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth9 and Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.92 The B.F. Goodrich Court recognized the possibility that
individuals, who obtained positions with a competitor of their former
employer, could disclose the trade secrets of their former employer to the new
employer. Kewanee Oil is a case that renewed the United States Supreme Court's
involvement in the area of trade secrets. 93 The question facing the Kewanee Oil
Court was whether state protection of trade secrets is preempted by United
States Patent Law. Chief Justice Burger recognized the importance of trade
secret law in his majority opinion by stating that its purpose is the promotion
of innovative ideas not entirely protected by patent law.94 The Kewanee Oil
85 Throughout the investigation, the media portrayed P & G as a powerful
corporation using its influence to abuse the legal system. See supra note 11.
86 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.51 (Baldwin 1991).
87See supra UNIF. TRADE SECREIs Acr, 14 U.L.A. 434 at 78-86 (Supp. 1992).
88M. JAGER, supra note 29, at § OH-01.
89OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.99(E) (Baldwin 1991).
90M. JAGER, supra note 29, at § OH-01.
91192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio 1963).
92416 U.S. 470 (1974).
93 See generally M. JAGER, supra note 29, at § OH-01.
94416 U.S. at 485.
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Court left the regulation and protection of trade secrets with the states by
holding that there existed no conflict with the federal patent laws.95
Ohio's trade secret statute was placed into the criminal code as an instrument
"[tjo maintain standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of
invention, as well as the protection of the substantial investment of employers
in their proprietary information."96 The criminal statute affords a very broad
interpretation of trade secrets that encompasses a significant amount of
business property.97 The statutory language indicates this by using the
terminology "any business plans, financial information", which infers that all
business information intended to remain secret will be protected under the
statute. Since there is no provision that requires a company to distinguish
between property and information for purposes of trade secret classification,
the language of the statute provides much flexibility for businesses attempting
to obtain protection under the code.
In order to comply with Ohio's statute, a company must meet two
requirements. First, the company must show that the element of secrecy
surrounds the subject matter. A company meets this requirement by proving
that the information is unknown within the respective industry and outside
the general knowledge of the public.98 Second, the company must prove that
951d. at 492-93.
96 Valco Cincinnati, Inc. v. N & D Machining Serv., Inc., 492 N.E.2d 814, 820 (Ohio
1986).
97 A trade secret is defined under Ohio's code as:
[tihe whole or any portion or phase of any scientific or technical
information, design, process, procedure, formula, or improvement, or
any business plans, financial information, or listing of names, addresses,
or any telephone numbers, which has not been published or dissemin-
ated, or otherwise become a matter of general public knowledge. Such
scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula,
or improvement, or any business plans, financial information, or listing
of names, addresses, or telephone numbers is presumed to be secret
when the owner thereof takes measures designed to prevent it, in the
ordinary course of business, from being available to persons other than
those selected by the owner to have access thereto for limited purposes.
OHIoREV. CODEANN. § 1333.51(A)(3) (Baldwin 1991). Once it is determined that a trade
secret exists, Revised Code § 1333.51(4)(B) states the following violation: "[n]o person
shall, with intent to deprive or withhold from the owner thereof the control of a trade
secret, or with intent to convert a trade secret to his own use or the use of another, obtain
possession of or access to an article representing a trade secret." Id.
98 See Wiebold Studio, Inc. v. Old World Restorations, Inc., 484 N.E.2d 280,284 (Ohio
App. 1985). The purpose of the secrecy requirement is twofold. First, a company must
prove the element of secrecy exists in order to qualify its property for trade secret
consideration. The degree to which the information is known to parties outside the
company affects the property's status as a trade secret. Second, the secrecy requirement
assists the courts in deciding cases where an employee leaves a company to work for a
competitor of the former employer. The former company initiates legal action against
both the former employee and the competing business by claiming a loss resulting from
disclosure. The court must determine whether the employee possesses information
qualifying as a trade secret to the former employer. Information that is readily known
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precautions were taken to protect the secret. A strict reading of the code
suggests a presumption that a trade secret exists when secrecy is maintained.
In Water Management, Inc. v. Stayanchi,99 the Ohio Supreme Court determined
that the statute places the burden of proving the existence of secrecy on the
party possessing the property. The Stayanchi Court stated that a trade secret
cannot be presumed unless the owner took action to preserve the secret.100 A
company's compliance with the protection requirement is determined by an
evaluation of the facts based on a standard of reasonableness. 10 1
Ohio courts are not limited to the criminal code in defining trade secrets for
purposes of civil cases. In Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp.,l 2 the United States
Supreme Court stated that Ohio "[a]dopted the widely relied-upon definition
of a trade secret" 103 as found in the Restatement of Torts. In a later case, Wiebold
Studio v. Old World Restorations,104 the Ohio Supreme Court provided support
for this contention by stating that Ohio's statute applies to the criminal offense
and cannot be interpreted "[a]s a complete statement of the Ohio law of trade
secrets."105 The Ohio Supreme Court eventually recognized the Restatement's
definition of trade secrets in Valvo Cincinnati, Inc. v. N & D Machining Service,
Inc.,10 6 thereby comj~lementing Ohio's criminal code. In effect, the Ohio
Supreme Court's adoption of the Restatement provides two definitions of trade
secrets which can be utilized by the courts in civil cases.
or used throughout the industry and information that is determined to be general
knowledge will not qualify for treatment as a trade secret. Trade secret status will not
be awarded unless it is established that the company's information, or use of the
information, is unique within the respective industry. See, e.g., Valvo Cincinnati, Inc. v.
N. & D. Machining Serv., Inc., 492 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 1986); Wiebold Studio, Inc. v. Old
World Restorations, Inc., 484 N.E.2d 280 (Ohio 1985).
99472 N.E.2d 715 (Ohio 1984).
lO0d. at717. See, e.g., Valvo Cincinnati, Inc. v. N. & D. Machining Serv., Inc., 492 N.E.2d
814 (Ohio 1986). In Valvo Cincinnati, the appellee brought action seeking an injunctive
order terminating appellant's use of a special glue applicator. Valvo Cincinnati took
protective measures by providing adequate locking devices, screening all visitors,
utilizing a shredder on all drawings and requiring key employees to sign non-disclosure
agreements. The court held that, "under the circumstances, the company took
reasonable precautions to protect the secrecy of its information." Id. at 819.
1011d.
102416 U.S. 470 (1973).
103Id. at 474.
104484 N.E.2d 284 (Ohio 1985).
105 Id. at 288. But see Maier & Assoc. v. Seifert, No. CA-8646 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS
6354 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21,1991). (using Revised Code § 1333.51(A)(3) in determining
the existence of a trade secret for a claim of tortious interference).
106492 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 1986).
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B. Confidential Information Under Ohio's Catch-All Code
If any doubts remained concerning whether the interests of business,
especially confidential information, should be protected in Ohio, they were
answered by another criminal statute enacted in 1974, Revised Code section
1333.81.107 Section 1333.81 is essentially a "catch-all" provision that includes
any confidential proprietary information not meeting the classification of a
trade secret under Revised Code section 1333.51. Section 1333.81 provides that
"no employee of another, who in the course and within the scope of his
employment receives any confidential matter or information shall knowingly,
without the consent of his employer, furnish or disclose such matter or
information to any person not privileged to acquire it.'108 An employee found
violating this section can be charged with a misdemeanor of the first degree.109
One may infer from section 1333.81 that it was the intention of the framers
to place a high value on the confidential relationship between the employer
and employee. A company's confidential information is also recognized as
protectable, intangible property despite its lack of monetary value.110
Enactment of section 1333.81 into the criminal code, as a supplement to trade
secret law, strengthens the position that Ohio respects the agency relationship
created within the business and that the state intends to protect against the loss
of intangible property resulting from a breach of that relationship. 11
It remains unclear as to how much information the framers intended to
protect by placing section 1333.81 into the criminal code. Reviewing this
statute's prior history may provide a better understanding of the statute's
purpose. Section 1333.81 replaced an earlier statute, Revised Code section
2923.29.112 Section 2923.29 prohibited any person from disclosing "all or any
portion of any matter taken by him '113 while employed as a stenographer,
107 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.81 (Baldwin 1991).
108Id.
109 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.99(F) (Baldwin 1991).
110Confidential information is recognized as an intangible property right belonging
to its holder. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). It is the owner's right to the
exclusive use of the confidential information that makes it valuable as property. Id. at
26-27.
111Although Revised Code § 1333.81 provides relief in criminal court, damages are
available in civil court for breach of the confidential relationship. See supra notes 59 and
67 and accompanying text. By placing this statute within the criminal code, Ohio
lawmakers have provided the employer with an additional remedy. The code closely
resembles the language describing the agent's duties in § 395 of the REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958). See supra notes 55 and 108 and accompanying text.
112OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.29 (Anderson 1954).
113 Id.
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without the consent of the employer.114 A stenographer who divulged
information, without the permission of the employer, would be in violation of
Revised Code Section 2923.29.
In its proposal to the 1974 criminal code, the Technical Committee of the Ohio
General Assembly believed that every employee "owes at least minimal loyalty
to his employer, and should be criminally liable for an improper breach of his
employer's confidence. " 115 The 1974 code adopted the proposal and expanded
criminal liability to include all employees. The inclusion of all employees into
Revised Code section 1333.81, supplemented by the statute's legislative history,
suggests that the framers' intent was to create a statute requiring all employees
to maintain strict adherence to the agency relationship arising within the work
place. The courts have stated that section 1333.81 is limited to describing
criminal offenses and has no effect on action taken in civil cases.
116
In summary, Ohio maintains two criminal statutes that allow employers to
protect their proprietary business property. Revised Code section 1333.51(A)(1)
provides a broad interpretation of trade secrets in order to shield a business
from any loss due to employee misappropriation. Revised Code section 1333.81
supplements the trade secret law by safeguarding the loss of information
acquired during the course of the confidential working relationship. Thus,
information not meeting the trade secret definition as stated in Revised Code
section 1333.51(A)(1) can be established as protected property under an
interpretation of Revised Code section 1333.81. Enactment of both statutes into
the criminal code supports the conclusion that Ohio places a high value on
protecting both the proprietary property and the confidential employment
relationship found within a business.
Under the Procter & Gamble scenario, if the company pursued criminal
action, the prosecutor's office could choose between either statute in their
attempt to locate the individual responsible for disclosing P & G's confidential
business information. The question remains whether confidential information
such as the forced resignation of a key executive and the sale of various
divisions or food groups,117 are the type of information meant to be protected
as trade secrets under the criminal code.1 18 Ohio's statute, however, provides
114 Revised Code § 2923.29 provided the following testimonial exception: any person
employed as a stenographer, called as a witness regarding employment matters, was
directed to testify. Id.
11SProposed Criminal Code, OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, at 7 (1971).
Although the current section number within the code is § 1333.81, the proposed code
number was § 1333.71.
116Wiebold Studio, Inc. v. Old World Restorations, Inc., 484 N.E.2d 280, 288 (Ohio
1985).
117 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
118The P & G investigation was terminated before it was determined whether action
would have been brought under Ohio's trade secret statute. One element often
considered by the courts in determining a trade secret is whether the subject matter
provides the owner with an advantage over competitors in the industry. See
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a very broad definition of trade secrets that may have included the
unauthorized disclosure of P & G's information.
Revised Code section 1333.81 affords recourse and would have provided an
available remedy despite a finding that the information was not protected
under trade secret law. Evidence existed indicating that one of the statutes had
been violated. P & G encountered the problem of locating the individual
responsible for disclosing the information. Management, by searching private
telephone records, chose to pursue an investigation which targeted the public
sector. It was the scope of this search that placed P & G under the scrutiny of
the media and which eventually led to the termination of the investigation.
Issuance of a grand jury subpoena requiring the author of the articles to name
the informant provides a more effective alternative for locating the sources of
disclosure. 119 By choosing this course of action, the company's investigation
would have excluded private citizens and dispossessed the media of an ally in
their attack on P & G.120
Although more favorable results may have emanated from the grand jury, a
direct inquiry of The Wall Street Journal through the use of a grand jury subpoena
may not have proved an easy task. Under a grand jury subpoena, The Wall Street
Journal would most likely counter with an argument that news reporters
possess an absolute privilege under the U.S. Constitution and that state laws
exist protecting reporters from disclosing their confidential informants. The
basis of the media's argument is that freedom of the press, as guaranteed under
the First Amendment, affords an implied absolute privilege to members of the
media.12 1 The contention that newspersons are protected by an absolute
privilege is also supported by the enactment of statutes found within various
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984); Wiebold Studio, Inc. v. Old
World Restorations, Inc. 484 N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ohio 1985). See generally J. POOLEY, supra
note 19, at 21. REVISED CODE § 1333.51(A)(3) does not require that a trade secret provide
the owner with a competitive advantage. P & G would have been presented with a
greater task of establishing that the information disclosed to The Wall Street Journal
qualified as trade secrets if the existence of a competitive advantage was a requirement.
See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. P & G's disclosed information included the
resignation of a key officer and the sale of certain food and beverage divisions.
1 19 A grand jury subpoena would have compelled the news reporter to disclose the
confidential informants. The value of the grand jury's role and its ability to subpoena
has been described as follows: "Fair and effective law enforcement aimed at providing
security for the person and property of the individual is a fundamental function of
government and the grand jury plays an important, constitutionally mandated role in
this process." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972).
120The scope of the investigation included the search of over 650,000 telephone lines
in southern Ohio. See Scope of Phone Probe Grows, USA TODAY, August 15, 1991, at 1A.
P & G was confronted with the media's claims that thecompanyhad invaded theprivacy
of individuals and infringed on the freedom of the press. An inquiry of the news
reporter, through the use of the grand jury subpoena, would have excluded the
investigation of private citizens, thus leaving the media with an apathetic reader.
12 1The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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states referred to as "shield laws". 122 However, neither the U.S. Constitution or
Ohio's shield statute provide the media with an absolute privilege.
V. PROTECTING THE REPORTER'S CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES
A. No Absolute Privilege Under the First Amendment
The media, while protecting their interest in the dissemination of the news,
can always assert a freedom of the press defense.123 Although some protection
has been extended to the media under the First Amendment, the courts are
unwilling to grant an absolute right.124 Reporters contend that protecting the
news gathering process necessitates the recognition of an absolute privilege in
order to conceal confidential sources and information. 125 This argument is
advanced in an attempt to avoid the disclosure of informants when reporters
are required to respond to a grand jury subpoena. The reporters claim that any
detriment to the assembly and dissemination of the news will be a handicap to
122 Shield laws, enacted by states, provide news reporters with a privilege that protects
confidential informants. The scope of the privilege is determined by the court's
interpretation of their respective state's statute. See Charles S. Plumb, Note, The
Protection of Confidential News Sources: Enhancing the Utility of Ohio's Shield Law, 42 OHIO
ST. L. J. 1039, 1045 (1981).
123 Freedom of the press is an argument used by the media to avoid grand jury
subpoenas in an effort to protect confidential sources from disclosure. See Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). However, the freedom of the press argument was also used
by the media as a defense in a case that involved the media's breach of confidence. See
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). In Cohen, the plaintiff exchanged
information with the reporter based on a promise that the reporter would not reveal the
name of his source. The plaintiff sought damages under the theory of promissory
estoppel following the reporter's disclosure of the informant's name in breach of their
agreement. Although the reporters claimed that the case did not involve a First
Amendment issue, they argued that enforcement of the reporter's promise was barred
by the First Amendment. Id. at 2517. The United States Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment does not grant the media an immunity from the general laws of a state. Id.
at 2518-19. Thus, the theory of promissory estoppel was applicable to the press. Id. See
also Ruzika v. Conde Nast Publications, 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991).
124 The courts have consistently placed limits on the extent of the media's rights
inferred from the First Amendment. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20
(1984) (a protective order preventing the dissemination of information obtained during
discovery does not violate the First Amendment); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843 (1974) (limiting news reporter's access to prison inmates to the same restrictions
as the general public); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding newsmen not
entitled to protection against compelled disclosure of confidential sources); Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (reversing state court conviction based on trial court's
failure to control media). '"The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the
unrestrained right to gather information." Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
125 Newspersons argue that the compelled disclosure of confidential informants
interferes with their First Amendment responsibility. The rationale is that compelled
disclosure deters sources from revealing newsworthy information which will harm the
free flow of information needed to properly disseminate the news. See Branzburg 408
U.S. at 679-80; see Plumb, supra note 122, at 1047-48.
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their First Amendment guarantee.126 Thus, the media argues that anything less
than an absolute right will hamper its effectiveness because informants will be
discouraged from providing newsworthy information.127
The courts, refusing to accept this argument, have declared that reporters
are not immune from grand jury subpoenas. In Branzburg v. Hayes128 the United
States Supreme Court was given the opportunity to settle the issue of whether
the First Amendment shielded the reporter from disclosing confidential
sources. 129 The Branzburg majority held that the First Amendment guarantee
of freedom of speech and press is not violated by requiring reporters to testify
before federal or state grand juries.130 As a result of the decision, the First
Amendment does not entitle newspersons to an absolute privilege. Justice
White, in his majority opinion, stated that an absolute right was never
recognized under common law and has never been a constitutional
protection.131 Initially, the Court emphasized the important role played by the
grand jury in the administration of criminal justice, and their authority to
subpoena, as necessary in fulfillment of that role. 132 The Court determined that
reporters, like all citizens, have a duty to respond to grand jury subpoenas.
The High Court asserted that the prosecution of crimes resulted in the
deterrence of future criminal conduct, and thus took precedence over the
public's interest in being informed about future crimes.133 Justice White stated
that burdens placed on the press caused by the pursuit of criminal or civil
justice cannot always be invalidated under the First Amendment. 134 The
Branzburg opinion imposes a responsibility on all citizens to cooperate during
the investigation of crimes thus allowing no immunity for the media. The
Supreme Court's refusal to grant the reporter's testimonial privilege places the
126408 U.S. at 679-80.
12 7The news reporter is concerned that confidential informants will be afraid to reveal
information due to repercussions at the loss of their anonymity. Justice Douglas, in his
Branzburg dissent, described it best by stating that "A reporter is no better than his source
of information." Id. at 722.
128408 U.S. 665 (1972).
129 Branzburg v. Hayes was the consolidation of three cases granted certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court. The issue was whether the First Amendment permits
news reporters, under a grand jury subpoena, to refuse disclosing confidential
informants. Caldwell v. United States 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 402 U.S.
942 (1971); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970), cert. granted, 402
U.S. 942 (1970); In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), cert. granted, 402 U.S. 942
(1971).
130408 U.S. at 665.
1311d. at 684-85.
1321d. at 687-88.
1331d. at 695-97.
1341d. at 682.
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fundamental concern on the pursuit of justice and the prevention of crime,
rather than on the reporting of it.
Justice Stewart outlined a three-part balancing test in his dissenting opinion.
The balancing test would only apply following a reporter's motion to quash
the subpoena.135 The government's failure to meet the test would entitle the
news reporter to a testimonial privilege.136 Under Justice Stewart's balancing
test:
The government must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe
that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific
probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought
cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding
interest in the information.
13 7
Some courts, refusing to accept the Branzburg decision, have relied on Justice
Stewart's three-prong balancing test in order to provide a conditional privilege
for the media.138 The purpose of the informal balancing test, as construed by
these courts, is to insure that an element of good faith is present on any attempt
to force the revelation of a reporter's sources. 139 Thus, the proposal of the
informal balancing test responded to the concern that the disallowance of the
testimonial privilege would lead to the harassment of the press.
135Along with a motion to quash the subpoena, the reporter must prove the existence
of a confidential relationship that would establish the basis for the protection. Branzburg,
408 U.S. at 743.
13 6The informal balancing test is not new to the courts. An informal balancing test
was first applied in Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958). See Plumb, supra note
122, at 1039-41. The test presented in Garland was "[wihether the interest served by
compelling the testimony of the witness in the present case justifies some impairment
of this First Amendment freedom." Id. at 548. Although the reporter's privilege argued
for in Branzburg has never been recognized as absolute under the First Amendment,
some courts have been willing to allow a qualified privilege. See Plumb, supra note 122,
at 1039-41.
137408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972).
138 See generally National Broadcasting Co. v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 556 N.E.2d 1120,
1126-27 (Ohio 1990). Courts following Justice Stewart's balancing test may have
misconstrued Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Branzburg. Justice Powell
suggested a balancing between the interests of the reporter and those of the litigant. He
was the fifth vote in the Branzburg majority opinion, thus his failure to join the dissenting
opinion indicates his disagreement with Justice Stewart's balancing test. Id. at 1127.
13 9Courts applying a balancing test look for a legitimate purpose behind the issuance
of a subpoena. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10; National Broadcasting, 556 N.E.2d at
1127. The Branzburg Court responded to the good faith argument by stating that
reporters are not without recourse since grand juries are subject to judicial control and
are limited by the First and Fifth Amendments. 408 U.S. at 707-08.
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B. Ohio's Shield Statute Provides Conditional Privilege
The Branzburg decision did not bar the states from initiating action that
would protect reporters from the compelled disclosure of sources. State
legislatures responded immediately by enacting laws, referred to as "state
shield" statutes, that shield the news reporter from identifying informants. 140
The shield statutes were aimed at improving the flow of valuable information
to the media by shielding the source of otherwise unobtainable information.141
Reporters previously used this same rationale under their First Amendment
argument, a rationale which was rejected by the Branzburg Court.
Ohio's shield law, enacted in 1954, was in effect 18 years prior to the
Branzburg decision. Revised Code section 2739.12 provides the testimonial
privilege for reporters. 142 A strict reading of the code suggests that Ohio
provides the reporter with an absolute privilege to shield informants.1 43 The
courts, however, have interpreted the statute as supporting a conditional
privilege.
The extent of the reporter's privilege under Ohio's shield statute was
challenged by the defendant in In Re McAuley.144 Although the court failed to
address the issue of whether section 2739.12 provided the newsperson with an
absolute privilege, the opinion suggests that reporters are entitled to a
conditional privilege under the Ohio law.14 5 In McAuley, the defendant in a
California criminal trial instituted proceedings to compel an Ohio reporter to
testify as a necessary witness. The Ohio court applied the informal balancing
test proposed by Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Branzburg and
determined that the defendant had not overcome his burden of establishing
the relevancy of the reporter's testimony.146
140See generally Plumb, supra note 122, at 1045.
14 1Id. at 1309.
142 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Baldwin 1991).
143 Revised Code section 2739.12 states the following protection for news reporters:
No person engaged in the work of, or connected with, or employed
by any newspaper or by any press association for the purpose of
gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, disseminating, or publishing
news shall be required to disclose the source of any information
procured or obtained by such person in the course of his employment, in
any legal proceeding, trial, or investigation before any court, grand jury,
petit jury, or any officer thereof, before the presiding officer of any tribunal,
or his agent, or before any commission, department, division, or bureau
of this state, or before any county or municipal body, officer or committee
thereof.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Baldwin 1991).
144408 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
145 See generally Plumb, supra note 122, at 1054 -1055.
146408 N.E.2d at 707.
[Vol. 41:175
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss1/8
1993] TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 199
The result in McAuley strongly supports the proposition that Ohio does not
recognize an absolute privilege for the media. First, the opinion concentrates
on the applicable case law, placing primary emphasis on the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes.14 7 The court's reliance on
Branzburg and reluctance to focus on Ohio's shield statute may indicate their
dissatisfaction with the statutory language of the code.148 Next, the court
characterized the reporter's privilege as conditional, balancing the privilege
against the defendant's Sixth Amendment right in a criminal trial.14 9 The use
of a balancing test prior to granting the testimonial privilege signifies the
court's acknowledgment of a conditional privilege. Finally, the court concluded
that the trial court erred in granting an absolute privilege to the news reporter
under both the Ohio law and the First Amendment.150
The McAuley court was later criticized by the Ohio Supreme Court in
National Broadcasting Co. v. Ct. of Common Pleas.151 In National Broadcasting, a
court order was issued to a television station in order to preserve the news and
commentary tapes relevant to an upcoming trial. Relators argued that the court
order was issued in anticipation of a subpoena duces tecum which would
violate their qualified privilege as reporters. The National Broadcasting majority
disagreed with the McAuley court's use of the three-part balancing test
advocated by Justice Stewart in his Branzburg dissent.1 5 2 The National
Broadcasting court could not justify the appropriateness of employing a
balancing test that was rejected by the United States Supreme Court. 153
The National Broadcasting court, however, had no need to discuss the limits,
if any, of the reporter's privilege under the shield statute. Although the court
rejected the relators' argument that section 2739.12 protects reporters from
disclosing information, the relators had not been served with a subpoena and
147408 U.S. 665 (1972).
14 8The McAuley court emphasized the Branzburg opinion and the reporter's rights
under the First Amendment. McAuley, however, followed the Branzburg dissent by
applying the three-part balancing test. The Court had the opportunity to address the
issue regarding the extent of the testimonial privilege under Ohio's shield law but the
opinion failed to resolve the issue. See Plumb, supra note 122, at 1056-57.
149408 N.E.2d at 709.
150Id. at 710.
151556 N.E.2d 1120 (Ohio 1990).
1521d. at 1127.
153The reporters in Branzburg argued that the compelled disclosure of informants
would be a violation of the First Amendment unless: (1) the government proved it had
a compelling interest in the information, (2) the information was relevant to the case,
and (3) the information was unavailable from other sources. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 680 (1972). The United States Supreme Court's refusal to grant a reporter's
privilegewasa rejection of this test. The test presented by the Branzburg dissent coincides
with the reporter's argument, which has been accepted by some courts. See supra note
137 and accompanying text.
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thus were not entitled to a hearing under the reporter's shield statute.154 In
addition, Revised Code section 2739.12 prevents compelled disclosure of
sources, not information, which would have made the statute inapplicable
under the facts in National Broadcasting.155
Since McAuley and National Broadcasting failed to specifically resolve the
issue relating to the extent of the media's privilege, it remains unclear how the
Ohio courts will interpret Revised Code section 2739.12.156 The McAuley
opinion supports a conditional privilege based on the three-part balancing test
promulgated by the Branzburg dissent. McAuley's use of the test, however, was
criticized by the Ohio Supreme Court in National Broadcasting. Implications
from the two cases indicate that under the appropriate circumstances, Ohio
courts will adopt the Branzburg decision.157 It is very likely that the privilege
will perish once the state shield law is placed in conflict with an individual's
right under the U.S. Constitution. As stated by the McAuley Court, "[w]henever
there is a conflict between a statute and a constitutional provision, the statute
must fall."158
How does the reporter's privilege affect companies, such as Procter &
Gamble, who attempt to seek criminal action under the Ohio statutes that
protect trade secrets and prosecute employees for their breach of confidence?
Are there limitations to the shield law that allow the company an opportunity
to defend its interest? Currently, case law indicates that Ohio's shield statute
limits the media to a qualified privilege. The reporter's privilege is available if
the government fails to satisfy the three-prong balancing test that was outlined
by the Branzburg dissent and adopted by the McAuley Court.159 It is an
154The protective order. was issued to preserve the news and commentary tapes
related to an alleged murder. Relators argued that the Court anticipated the issuance of
a subpoena duces tecum, thus the protective order was issued. The Court noted that the
relators never alleged that confidential sources would be disclosed when the news tapes
are eventually obtained through the subpoena. National Broadcasting Co. v. Ct. of
Common Pleas, 556 N.E.2d 1120, 1127 (Ohio 1990).
155The material, subject to the court order in National Broadcasting, related to
information and was not alleged to have contained reporter's sources. Revised Code
section 2739.12 protects confidential sources, not information obtained by the reporter.
See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Baldwin 1991).
15 61t is the role of the courts to interpret the statutory language of the shield statute,
thus case law will determine the extent of the testimonial privilege. See Plumb, supra
note 122, at 1045-46.
15 7An Ohio court is likely to abandon the reporter's privilege when a defendant's
constitutional rights are at issue. This may occur when the defendant's rights under the
Fifth or Sixth Amendment conflict with the reporter's testimonial privilege. The Fifth
Amendment entitles the defendant to due process of the law. Under the Sixth
Amendment, the defendant is entitled "to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor." See generally Plumb, supra note 122, at 1040.
158 In Re McAuley 408 N.E.2d 697, 708 (Ohio App. 1979).
159Jd.
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examination of the facts in light of the balancing test that gives companies
recourse in battling the protection afforded the media under the shield statute.
Applying the facts relative to the P & G incident demonstrates how the test
is applied. The first prong of the test requires proof that a relevant connection
exist between the violation and the information. P & G's confidential
information was published in a national newspaper. As a result of the
publication, it was discovered that an employee had breached his employer's
confidence in violation of Ohio's criminal code. Since the publication can be
linked to the employee's breach, a relevant connection exists and the first prong
has been satisfied.
To satisfy the second prong the government must show that there are no
alternatives available, less burdensome on First Amendment rights, in
obtaining the information from the reporter. In P & G for instance, one option
available was the review of records of telephone calls made from the Cincinnati
area to The Wall Street Journal and to the author of the articles. The government
would have the choice between viewing over 650,000 telephone lines or issuing
a subpoena to the news reporter in determining the name of the informant. The
first alternative comes close to invading the private lives of citizens, while the
second challenges a flexible privilege afforded newspersons. Since the United
States Supreme Court has failed to recognize the testimonial privilege under
the First Amendment, the harm to the reporter appears less destructive than
the search through the telephone records of numerous private individuals.
Arguably there existed no viable alternative and thus, the government would
have been successful under the second prong of the test.
Finally, the government must show that disclosure of the information serves
a compelling interest. Analysis under this prong should place the issue in
proper perspective and settle the confrontation existing between the media's
privilege and a company's remedy under the criminal code. A company
attempts to protect certain proprietary information because the loss of this
information can have a detrimental effect on the business. Ohio recognizes the
value of the protected information by providing relief for the unlawful
disclosure of a company's proprietary information. As a result, the company's
loss of information, as well as the company's right to take legal action under
the code, provides the compelling interest that satisfies the third prong. Thus
the government would satisfy the test, and the reporter would not be entitled
to the testimonial privilege.
VI. CONCLUSION
Trade secrets and confidential information play a very important role in the
continuing operation of a business. The Ohio Legislature recognized their
value by affording protection to each under separate statutes within the
criminal code.160 These statutes protect a company against loss resulting from
the misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential proprietary information
160OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Baldwin 1991).
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by employees. The protection provided under both statutes is illusory to a
business, howev&, if the violator is permitted to remain anonymous.
Locating the guilty individual can be a difficult task for most companies.
This task is more critical but further complicated when the disclosure is made
to a member of the media which may result in the publication of the
confidential information. Acompany's inability to determine the identity of the
wrongdoer can lead to the continued publication of valuable corporate
information that can seriously threaten the existence of the business.
The Ohio criminal statutes should afford a company the opportunity to
locate the wrongdoer which would terminate the improper disclosure of
confidential proprietary information to the media. The identity of the guilty
party can be determined through the issuance of a grand jury subpoena,
compelling disclosure of the news reporter's informant. Limited protection has
been granted to the media, however, which may provide an aegis to protect the
identity of their informants.
Branzburg v. Hayes161 held that the First Amendment does not grant a
testimonial privilege to reporters. Although the Ohio courts have failed to
adopt the Branzburg decision, the legislature provides a shield statute which
grants protection to the media if the government fails to meet a three-prong
balancing test.162 The shield statute, in effect, directly conflicts with the
protection afforded a company's trade secrets and confidential information.
Application of the three-prong balancing test should defeat the media's
conditional privilege, thus sustaining a company's efforts to protect
proprietary information.
Although the outcome would be favorable to the company, the use of a
balancing test is not appropriate since it does not address the real issue
surrounding a company's proprietary information. Trade secrets and
confidential information are communicated to employees during the course of
their confidential employment relationship. It is this relationship that requires
protection. To allow the disclosure of valuable proprietary information to the
media will destroy the confidence within that relationship. It was not the intent
of the Ohio General Assembly to provide statutes which make it a crime for
employees to disclose confidential information to competitors but permit
disclosure of that same information to news reporters. A company's interest in
protecting confidential information and trade secrets cannot be sacrificed by
allowing an informant to remain anonymous through the use of the reporters'
testimonial privilege. A shield for the media provides an opportunity for
employees to disclose trade secrets and confidential information to competitors
through the media which undermines the company's vested interest in
protecting essentially confidential information. Unless the shield is removed,
161408 U.S. 665 (1972).
162See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
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the reporter's privilege will continue to protect the breach of confidence by
employees, thus taking the employee out of the employment relationship.
JOHN M. TKACIK, JR.
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